Here is what I have written for my paper.
Quote
To settle the moral issue of abortion it then becomes important to understand “what properties must something have to be a person.” To do so, I will make use of the works by Peter Strawson and Harry Frankfurt. In the third chapter of his book “Individuals” argues against two conceptions of thought and the individual person; the Cartesian account and what Strawson called the ‘no ownership theory’. The no ownership theory “is the idea that we do not really refer to ourselves when we use the first person pronoun, even though we seem to. There is nothing that owns or has the experiences to which to refer.” While the Cartesian account views the ‘I’ as referring to a pure subject of experience. Strawson states neither of these views have a sufficient concept of a person.
I feel so attached to what in fact I call my body ... why I should speak of this body as mine. But they do not explain why I should have the concept of myself at all, why I should ascribe my thoughts and experiences to anything. ... and they do not explain why, if experiences are to be ascribed to something, they and the corporeal characteristics which might truly be ascribed to the favoured body should be ascribed to the same thing. So the facts in question do not explain the use we make of the word 'I' ... They do not explain the concept of a person (pp. 93f.).
What Strawson expresses is the idea that the concept of a person must refer to both the mental and physical aspects of a person. When an individual refers to the self, it refers to an entity with two aspects, mental and physical, not an entity where the two are separate. Strawson called this a primitive concept of a person, a concept to which both mental and physical predicates can be ascribed, not one reducible to a conjunction of two distinct mental and physical entities. Such that the use of the term ‘I’ refers to the person using it. As we can ascribe these predicates to the self, we should in turn be capable of ascribing these same predicates to others, provided the criteria are logically adequate.
This view is still insufficient, it shows a person to be an entity of both mental and physical predicates, but most animals can be said to have both as well; they have physical bodies and exhibit behavioural patterns to indicate certain, albeit limited, mental predicates. Yet we do not consider animals to be persons. Ultimately there is little difference between the physical predicates applicable between an animal and a human, yet we only consider humans as persons at any point. Thus the ultimate difference between a person and non-person should lay with the applicable mental predicates. Not to say only humans can ever be persons, humans are simply the only entities to which we currently apply the term. As Harry Frankfurt writes: “What interests us most in the human condition would not interest us less if it were also a feature of the condition of other creatures as well.”
Frankfurt argues that the essential difference between persons and non-persons is found in the structure of “a person’s will.” Humans possess mental predicates which correspond to desires and motives, as does any organic creature, to determine choices and actions. It is, according to Frankfurt, characteristically human to be “able to form what I shall call ‘second-order desires’ or ‘desires of the second order.” Consider a statement in the form of “A wants to X.” Such a statement expresses a first-order desire, a statement in which the term “to X” refers to a specific action. This statement of itself contains very little information on the desire itself, neither the strength of the desire nor the importance of the desire to future decision making. It is also not unlikely for there to be conflicting desires; “A wants to X” while simultaneously “A wants to ¬X.” It is these kinds of desires which express a person’s will. “To identify an agent's will is either to identify the desire (or desires) by which he is motivated in some action he performs or to identify the desire (or desires) by which he will or would be motivated when or if he acts. An agent's will, then, is identical with one or more of his first-order desires.” Although, the notion of will is not coextensive with the notion of first-order desires. “Rather, it is the notion of an effective desire – one that moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action.” The will is then that first-order desire which has effectively come about.
The second-order desires are those desires which in turn refer to other desires. It is a desire in the form of “A wants to X,” where X refers to a first order desire, making it a desire in the form of “A wants to want to X.” There are two ways for this desire to apply. First is to only desire to desire X, not to act on this desire to X. In other words, A possesses the second-order desire to want to want X, while A lacks the first-order desire to want X. The second is the desire to desire X where A wants this desire to X be effective, A desires the desire to X to be his or her will. Harry Frankfurt writes: “Someone has a desire of the second order either when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will. In situations of the latter kind, I shall call his second-order desires ‘second-order volitions’ or ‘volitions of the second order.’ Now it is having second-order volitions, and not having second-order desires generally, that I regard as essential to being a person.” Then to determine someone to be a person, it would be necessary to ascribe these second-order volitions to the subject. To do so, I refer back to Strawson, the criteria for ascribing any kind of mental predicate must be logically adequate. As persons can self-ascribe these second-order volitions, it must be possible to other-ascribe the same, given logically adequate criteria. Thus the concerned subject must exhibit some form of behaviour or expression which shows the presence of second-order volitions.
I feel so attached to what in fact I call my body ... why I should speak of this body as mine. But they do not explain why I should have the concept of myself at all, why I should ascribe my thoughts and experiences to anything. ... and they do not explain why, if experiences are to be ascribed to something, they and the corporeal characteristics which might truly be ascribed to the favoured body should be ascribed to the same thing. So the facts in question do not explain the use we make of the word 'I' ... They do not explain the concept of a person (pp. 93f.).
What Strawson expresses is the idea that the concept of a person must refer to both the mental and physical aspects of a person. When an individual refers to the self, it refers to an entity with two aspects, mental and physical, not an entity where the two are separate. Strawson called this a primitive concept of a person, a concept to which both mental and physical predicates can be ascribed, not one reducible to a conjunction of two distinct mental and physical entities. Such that the use of the term ‘I’ refers to the person using it. As we can ascribe these predicates to the self, we should in turn be capable of ascribing these same predicates to others, provided the criteria are logically adequate.
This view is still insufficient, it shows a person to be an entity of both mental and physical predicates, but most animals can be said to have both as well; they have physical bodies and exhibit behavioural patterns to indicate certain, albeit limited, mental predicates. Yet we do not consider animals to be persons. Ultimately there is little difference between the physical predicates applicable between an animal and a human, yet we only consider humans as persons at any point. Thus the ultimate difference between a person and non-person should lay with the applicable mental predicates. Not to say only humans can ever be persons, humans are simply the only entities to which we currently apply the term. As Harry Frankfurt writes: “What interests us most in the human condition would not interest us less if it were also a feature of the condition of other creatures as well.”
Frankfurt argues that the essential difference between persons and non-persons is found in the structure of “a person’s will.” Humans possess mental predicates which correspond to desires and motives, as does any organic creature, to determine choices and actions. It is, according to Frankfurt, characteristically human to be “able to form what I shall call ‘second-order desires’ or ‘desires of the second order.” Consider a statement in the form of “A wants to X.” Such a statement expresses a first-order desire, a statement in which the term “to X” refers to a specific action. This statement of itself contains very little information on the desire itself, neither the strength of the desire nor the importance of the desire to future decision making. It is also not unlikely for there to be conflicting desires; “A wants to X” while simultaneously “A wants to ¬X.” It is these kinds of desires which express a person’s will. “To identify an agent's will is either to identify the desire (or desires) by which he is motivated in some action he performs or to identify the desire (or desires) by which he will or would be motivated when or if he acts. An agent's will, then, is identical with one or more of his first-order desires.” Although, the notion of will is not coextensive with the notion of first-order desires. “Rather, it is the notion of an effective desire – one that moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action.” The will is then that first-order desire which has effectively come about.
The second-order desires are those desires which in turn refer to other desires. It is a desire in the form of “A wants to X,” where X refers to a first order desire, making it a desire in the form of “A wants to want to X.” There are two ways for this desire to apply. First is to only desire to desire X, not to act on this desire to X. In other words, A possesses the second-order desire to want to want X, while A lacks the first-order desire to want X. The second is the desire to desire X where A wants this desire to X be effective, A desires the desire to X to be his or her will. Harry Frankfurt writes: “Someone has a desire of the second order either when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will. In situations of the latter kind, I shall call his second-order desires ‘second-order volitions’ or ‘volitions of the second order.’ Now it is having second-order volitions, and not having second-order desires generally, that I regard as essential to being a person.” Then to determine someone to be a person, it would be necessary to ascribe these second-order volitions to the subject. To do so, I refer back to Strawson, the criteria for ascribing any kind of mental predicate must be logically adequate. As persons can self-ascribe these second-order volitions, it must be possible to other-ascribe the same, given logically adequate criteria. Thus the concerned subject must exhibit some form of behaviour or expression which shows the presence of second-order volitions.
Giant wall o' text, I know, just bear with me here.
Now, I have two goals with this topic.
First is I genuinely think it an interesting topic and would like to read the ideas of different people on the subject.
The other is that I would welcome some feedback on what I wrote. Whether you agree or disagree, I'd like to know why.
Oh, and please let me know if you spot any grammatical or other errors. Not a native speaker so I would appreciate any corrections.
________________
Do but despise reason and science,
The highest of all human gifts -
Then you have surrendered to the Devil
And must surely perish. - J.W. von Goethe
